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Religion and Resistance: The Role of Islamic Doctrine in Hamas and Hezbollah 
 
Matthew Lawson 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The recent conflict in Gaza between the state of Israel and Palestinians led by 
Hamas has again brought the question of Palestinian statehood to the attention of the 
international community. Religion has often been mentioned as a cause for the conflict 
between the two, as well as a reason for the perceived instability of the Middle East. It is 
within this frame of reference that this study takes place. This study attempts to use this 
emergence in current events as the starting point for the interaction between religion and 
resistance movements, examining the incorporation of Islamic doctrine into the actions 
towards Israel of the resistance movements Hamas and Hezbollah. 
 In an attempt to determine the incorporation of Islam into resistance movements, 
this study will undertake case studies on two leading Islamic resistance movements, 
Hamas and Hezbollah. The Islamic doctrine to be investigated in these studies is that of 
the Umma, the worldwide community of Muslim believers.   These case studies will 
examine how the doctrine of umma affects the two resistance movements, as well as 
variations in its interpretation in the two movements. This will allow for both an 
understanding of religious influence in resistance movements, but will also examine the 
differentiation of understanding of doctrine in Islam, as Hamas is primarily a Sunni 
organization, while Hezbollah is primarily Shiite. In this, a greater understanding of each 
of these concepts and their interaction will be gained. 
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Timeline 
 
1917 Balfour Declaration expresses intention for a national home for Jewish 
people in Palestine. 
 
1920 France designates territory of Lebanon. 
 
1928 Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna. 
 
1943 Lebanon granted independence from France. 
 
1947-1948 United Nations approves the partition of British mandate of Palestine; 
Israel declares independence. 
 
1967 Six Days War: War between Israeli and Arab forces, Israel captures Sinai 
Peninsula, Gaza, West Bank, Jerusalem, and Golan Heights; Israeli victory 
signals demise of Arab Nationalism. 
 
1975-1982 Lebanese Civil War 
 
1978 Musa al-Sadr, leader of Shia movement in Lebanon (founder of Amal) 
disappears. 
 
1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran brings Ayatollah Khomeini to power. 
 
1982 Operation Peace for Galilee: Israeli invasion of Lebanon that sparked the 
formation of Hezbollah. 
 
1985 Hezbollah publishes Open Letter, which expresses the movement’s 
ideology and aims. 
 
1987 Formation of Hamas, publishing of the Charter of Hamas 
 
1987-1993 First Intifada: Popular uprising of Palestinians in response to Israeli 
occupation of Gaza and the West Bank; ended with signing of the Oslo 
Accords. 
 
1988 Conflict between Hezbollah and Amal, victory of Hezbollah grants 
organization recognition as Lebanese force. 
 
1992 Hasan Nasrallah comes to power as secretary general of Hezbollah; first 
time Hezbollah participates in Lebanese national elections. 
 
1993 Israeli Operation Accountability – invasion of Lebanon by Israel. 
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1996 Israel invades Lebanon in Operation Grapes of Wrath. 
 
2000-2005 Ariel Sharon visits Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem sparking the Second 
Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada). Nearly five years of fighting follow. 
 
2006 Hamas wins majority in Palestinian Parliamentary elections. War between 
Israel and Hezbollah, Israel’s first defeat by Arab forces. 
 
2007 Power sharing agreement between Hamas and Palestinian Authority (PA) 
collapses, PA forms government in West Bank, Hamas in Gaza. 
 
2008 Hezbollah gains veto authority on Lebanese cabinet decisions. 
 
2008-2009 War between Israel and Hamas, no clear victor in the conflict. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
On December 27, 2008, Israel launched an offensive military offensive into the 
Gaza Strip in response to rockets which had been fired into its territory. The rocket 
attacks had been directed by Hamas, the Palestinian political organization elected to 
power in the Palestinian Authority in 2006, as well as an organization designated as a 
terrorist group by the United States government. This conflict has again brought global 
attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as reigniting discussions regarding 
Palestinian statehood and the issue of sovereignty in the area. These issues are far from 
being a new phenomenon, which may be seen through a brief examination of history.  
 In 1917 while controlling the territory of Greater Palestine (currently Israel, parts 
of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and West Bank), as a mandate, the British government stated 
support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Known as the Balfour Declaration, 
this document states the British would  “use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine” (Balfour Declaration, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfour.asp). 
Thirty years later, the United Nations moved forward with this issue, approving 
Resolution 181 (II), which proposed the creation of two states, one Arab and one Jewish, 
in Palestine. With this partition, the city of Jerusalem would exist as a separate entity 
from both of those states in order “to protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and 
religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the 
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world, Christian, Jewish, and Moslem” (Resolution 181 (II) p147)1. Neither group was 
fully satisfied with the proposal, but the Jewish delegate approved, while the Palestinian 
Arabs rejected the plan (Tharoor p10). With those actions, a Jewish state was created in 
Palestine, while the equivalent Palestinian state has still yet to be acknowledged by the 
United Nations as such (being identified as an entity rather than a state). This inequity in 
statehood has set the stage for conflict and resistance to the Israeli state and its interaction 
with the Palestinians. 
 From 1987 to 1993, diverse Islamic groups were engaged in a period of resistance 
against the Israeli state that was known as the Intifada. It was near this time period that 
both Hamas and Hezbollah were formed, with Hamas active in resistance throughout the 
Palestinian territories and Hezbollah active north of Israel in southern Lebanon. Less than 
a decade after end of the First Intifada, a Second Intifada erupted in 2000 following a 
visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem. While the First Intifada 
was primarily a secular, nationalist movement, the Second was ignited and sustained due 
to religious influences. Though religious tension had existed between Israel and both 
Palestinian and Arab forces throughout the Middle East, the Second Intifada once again 
thrust religion to the center of the conflict. While Palestinians resisted Israel during the 
Intifadas, Hezbollah struck at Israel from Lebanon through border raids, firing rockets 
into Israel and even was considered the victor of a 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah may 
literally be translated as the “party of God” and its actions to counter Israel are seen as 
primarily based in religious differences. In both the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah, 
religion plays an integral role in framing the resistance to Israel. 
                                                           
1 United Nations Resolutions accessed online - http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/88/IMG/NR003888.pdf?OpenElement 
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Question 
 With the connection between religion and resistance due to the Second Intifada as 
well as the conflict with Hezbollah in mind, there are questions that a study of this 
connection could explain and clarify. The main theme upon which all of these questions 
revolve is that of the relationship between religion and politics, which in this case is 
demonstrated through the role of religion in resistance. Therefore the central question of 
this study is as follows: What role, if any, does religious doctrine play in forming the 
policy and directing the action of resistance movements in the Islamic world? In 
considering this central question, I believe that the adoption of particular aspects of 
religious doctrines does play a role in resistance movements, and that how religious 
doctrines are perceived serves to create identity within resistance movements, meaning 
that the identity formed propels the movement to action.  
 In order to examine this question, it is necessary to study how religious doctrines 
have been incorporated into the policy and actions of specific resistance movements. For 
this study, I intend on focusing on resistance to Israel by Hamas and Hezbollah, in order 
to examine religious doctrine in resistance movements across the Sunni -Shiite divide. 
The religious doctrine to be examined is that of Umma, the universal community of 
Muslims (a concept that will be discussed in greater detail later). With this is mind, the 
question of this study becomes: How does the concept of Umma differ as a tool in the 
struggle against Israel between Sunni and Shiite groups, examining the majority Sunni 
group of Hamas and the majority Shiite group Hezbollah as models? At issue within this 
question is whether there is a difference between how the two view the concept of the 
umma, and how that is incorporated into their policies and actions. I believe that there is a 
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difference in the way Hezbollah and Hamas view the concept of umma. My view is that 
the difference between the two is a limit on the scope of the umma, with the Sunni group 
Hamas defining the umma more narrowly than the Shiite group Hezbollah. This slight 
difference between the Sunni and Shiite conception of umma would limit the action of 
the Sunni resistance movement. While both groups would be motivated to action due to 
the universal nature of umma, the understanding of umma will cause the groups to resist 
to different degrees and through different means. 
Theoretical Perspective 
 The question of this study examines the role which religion plays in resistance 
movements, focusing on the non-state actors Hezbollah and Hamas. In the field of 
international relations, the relationship between politics and religion has been widely 
overlooked, especially in the West, due to the ideals separating church and state. Further, 
international relations theory is dominated by state centric thought, which combined with 
the neglect of religion, has created a gap in theory for the framing of this study. Thus, to 
address this topic, it is necessary to find a theoretical foundation from which a study of 
the relationship between religion and politics may be launched. I believe that 
constructivism is the theoretical framework that provides this foundation.  
 According to John Ruggie, “Constructivism is about human consciousness and its 
role in international life” (Ruggie p856), a fairly broad statement, but one which indicates 
that constructivism looks to individual thought as the starting point, rather than state 
action. Christian Reus-Smit expands upon this by explaining “Constructivism is 
characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material 
structures on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually 
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constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (Reus-Smit p188). This point is 
echoed by Alexander Wendt’s claim that the structures in constructivism are social rather 
than material and the structures influence individuals more deeply than just in their 
actions (Wendt 1995, p71-72). In all three of these statements on constructivism it is clear 
that this theoretical perspective is focused on how individual and corporate thought and 
identity shape both political culture and action.  
 While a very basic overview of constructivism has been provided, it is more 
inclusive than this, and serves not as a theory but as an analytical framework (Reus-Smit 
p 202). Constructivism, as defined by Wendt has three core claims, which are as follows: 
“(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key 
structures in the states system are inter-subjective, rather than material; and (3) state 
identities and interests are an important part constructed by these social structures, rather 
than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” (Wendt 
1994, p385).   
 While these three principles are fairly uniform throughout constructivist 
scholarship, there are three primary schools of scholarship: systemic, unit level, and 
holistic (Reus-Smit p189). The systemic school is the school explained by Wendt, and is 
focused on the international level. Unit level constructivists “concentrate on the 
relationship between domestic, social, and legal norms, and the identities and interests of 
states”(Reus-Smit p200). The holistic school of constructivism holds the “view that the 
building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational 
factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only 
individual but also collective intentionality” (Ruggie p879). In focusing on both the 
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international reality and the individual and collective intentions, this holistic perspective 
of constructivism “treats the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social 
and political order” (Reus-Smit p201).  
 All of this is based on the argument that “actors are inherently social, that their 
identities and interests are socially constructed, the products of inter-subjective social 
structures” (Reus-Smit p193). With this in mind, we see that constructivism is a field of 
thought in international relations which examines political structures, whether they be 
international, domestic, or holistic. In this examination, constructivism seeks to look 
beyond undertaken action in order to understand the reasoning and motivation behind 
those actions. Further, it seeks to explain the creation of societal and cultural norms, 
placing importance on those norms, emphasizing how they create identity, on an 
individual and societal level. 
This study will attempt to start at a constructivist perspective due to this focus on 
the creation of identity and the creation of norms. In this study, religion will be examined 
as the factor that helps to establish both cultural norms and identity. With this bond 
between religion and identity, a relationship between religion and politics is also created. 
Further, this fetters identity to action, which, for this study, means that religious doctrines 
influence political action. So, while constructivism does not traditionally address the 
relationship between religion and politics, it does allow a space for that topic to be 
discussed. 
Study Design 
 With the study question in mind, as well as the theoretical framework, the design 
for undertaking the study must be addressed. This is a qualitative study of the relationship 
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of religion and politics, so for it, I will loosely use the case study method to conduct an 
exploratory study, the results of which will provide preliminary results for further study 
in the development of a testable hypothesis. In general, the case study method is used 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin p13). A case study is 
“understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is -at 
least in part- to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring p20). In this study, I will 
undertake studies on two non-government Islamist resistance organizations, Hamas and 
Hezbollah, providing an example of both Sunni and Shiite Islamist activity. The cases 
will focus on a contemporary phenomenon and will include collecting evidence from 
sources accessible to the researcher (Yin p23). In general, an exploratory case study  
“ (a) grapples with complex phenomena in real-life contexts; (b) recognizes that the complex 
nature and, at times, the contemporary character of the phenomena diminishes the degree of 
control that can be exerted by the investigator; (c) incorporates multiple sources of data as a means 
to acquire and corroborate observations regarding the phenomenon of interest; (d) tends to rely 
heavily, albeit not exclusively, on qualitative data; and (e) aims to provide a cogent, detailed 
portrait of the phenomenon-the attributes it assumes, the variations it displays, the ways it appears 
to operate, and the combinations of factors that seem to shape the patterns observed in natural 
settings” (Ogawa and Malen p 273). 
This study will incorporate the first four characteristics of this outline for an exploratory 
case study, but be less stringent on the last one, focusing more on the existence of the 
phenomena than with the operation or patterns formed by the relationship of religion and 
politics. 
Generally, it is preferable to use several sources and case study research allows 
“the opportunity to use multiple sources of evidence,” allowing the claim that this method 
“far exceeds that in other research strategies” (Yin p96). However, I will conduct only an 
exploratory case study for several reasons, including time constraints, lack of resources 
needed to access multiple sources of evidence, and because any hypothesis generated 
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would require prior preliminary testing before investing further in an attempt at 
validation. Normally case studies collect data of a quantitative and qualitative nature. 
These sources of evidence include archival information that is “primary source,” which is 
generated by a government itself and is found within the archives of government. 
Additionally, interviews are a primary source of evidence. Beyond this, documentation is 
useful “to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin p86) and includes 
“letters, memoranda, and other communiqués; agendas, announcements and minutes of 
meetings, and other written reports of events; administrative documents …; formal 
studies or evaluation of the same ‘site’ under study; and news clippings and other 
articles” (Yin p85).  While incorporating all these sources is preferable, this exploratory 
study will rely solely on “secondary sources” due to a lack of access into the core of 
Hezbollah and Hamas. One such source will be scholarly literature related to the two 
cases, covering the development and activity of both Hamas and Hezbollah. Additionally 
other articles will be used, primarily journal articles and books written for academic 
analysis of the role of religious doctrine in the resistance movements actions. Such 
sources will also be used to determine the significance of this study within the scholarly 
community and to provide a foundation upon which the study may be built and pursued. 
Another source of secondary evidence to be used will be news clippings and other media 
sources which describe, evaluate, and analyze the actions of the organizations.  
 Typically in using case study methodology, the data collected through these 
sources would be analyzed, through the explanation building analytical method. In this, 
the analysis of data attempts to explain the phenomenon, and thereby “to stipulate a set of 
causal links about it” which will allow for the establishment of explanations that “have 
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reflected some theoretically significant propositions” (Yin p113). This study will not take 
this final step. While the existence of a relationship between religion and politics 
examined through the role of the Islamic principle of Umma on the framing of resistance 
to Israel by both Hamas and Hezbollah may be used more generally to discern how 
religion is fused into the actions of resistance movements, this study is focused solely on 
establishing that relationship. The next step of creating causal links would be the focus of 
future study. 
Literature Review 
 Studying and building upon the findings of other scholars serves two purposes in 
this investigation. The first is to serve as a starting point for the study, to provide insight 
into what has been uncovered and to shed light on what areas should be investigated and 
which are superfluous. The second purpose of incorporating the findings of other scholars 
is to establish the topic as relevant to the scholarly community and therefore worthy of 
study. At this point, it is important to focus on the second of these purposes for the 
scholarly integrity of this study on religion and political action. 
 Beginning at the broadest scope of the question, the studies of Daniel Philpott 
examine the realm of religion and political studies. In “The Religious Roots of Modern 
International Relations,” Philpott states that religion and the study of international 
relations, the theoretical framework for this study, are intimately connected due to the 
birth of international relations with the Treaty of Westphalia, which he claims is due to 
the Protestant Reformation. The premise is that there is no way to detach politics, and the 
study thereof, from religion. More specific to the question at hand, in “Explaining the 
Political Ambivalence of Religion,” he claims that the level differentiation of state and 
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religion and the political theology (religious views of the legitimacy of political 
authority) can be used to understand political action of the state. Another scholar in this 
area of religion and politics is Jonathan Fox, who in “Religion as an Overlooked Element 
of International Relations” looks at the influence of religion on decision making, 
legitimacy, and international conflict, concluding that religion is inseparable from 
politics. These are extremely general studies, but demonstrate that the linking of religion 
and politics is an established area for study within the scholarly community. 
 More specifically than religion and politics, the role of Islam in the political 
system has also been an area for study. This has especially been the case since 1979 with 
the Iranian Revolution. A principle starting point for these studies must be the writings of 
foundational Islamist thinkers. With this in mind, the writings of Sayyid Qutb, especially 
Social Justice in Islam as well as the writings found in The Sayyid Qutb Reader, present a 
Sunni perspective of Islamism, while Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islam and 
Revolution presents a Shiite view. Beyond this, there are also secondary sources which 
must be considered. Authors within this area have focused varied topics, from Roxanne 
Euben’s focus on the rise of Islamism through the works of Sayyid Qutb to John Esposito 
attempt to explain the differences of Islam and radical Islamic fundamentalism in The 
Islamic Threat: Myth of Reality? Many of the studies in this realm will make reference 
back to Samuel Huntington’s widely read, polarizing work The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of World Order, which states that world politics is becoming aligned based 
to a degree on religion, and at times indicates that there is a looming conflict between the 
secular west and Islamic influenced states.  
 Going beyond Islam, the doctrine of umma has also served as an area for study 
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within the scholarly community. In Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the 
Umma, Peter Mandaville discusses the historical progression of the umma in Islam, 
interaction with the West and modernity, and how the umma is exists both within  
Diaspora and in states that are Muslim dominated. This study helps to show the evolution 
of the concept of umma in the Islamic world as well as the political importance of the 
umma. Another study that focuses on the umma is Olivier Roy’s Globalized Islam: The 
Search for a New Ummah. Throughout the course of the book, Roy covers the 
progression of Islam in the realm of politics, investigating the politicization of Islam, its 
interaction with Western culture and the responses which have come about. Further, Roy 
discusses possible future for the relationship between Islam and the West, and the role 
which conflict plays in that relationship. The idea of umma is also examined by Fred 
Halliday in “The Politics of Umma: States and Communities in Islamic Movements,” 
which emphasizes that umma is an important concept for the study of international 
relations, especially in considering ideology within globalization and transnationalism. 
While this is not a comprehensive discussion of the inclusion of umma within the study 
of politics in the scholarly community, it does demonstrate that umma is an important 
concept for political study.  
 A final area to mention in the establishment of scholarly tradition for this study of 
religion and politics is in the area of resistance movements. The scholars and works that 
create this area for study will be discussed in depth with the examination of Hamas and 
Hezbollah. In an effort to avoid repetition, these scholars and works will be reserved for 
the discussion of those movements and building the case for the role of the umma in 
framing Islamic resistance to Israel. 
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Introduction to Islam 
              Before proceeding any further in this study, or the discussion of this study, I feel 
it is necessary to provide a brief overview of Islam, as both a religion and political 
phenomenon. This will serve as a basis for much of the material which will be covered 
later, as well as introduce and define some terms which are of importance for this study. 
In this section, the history and beliefs of Islam will be described as a means of providing 
a backdrop for the study. 
              Islam is, first and foremost, one of the world’s most followed religions, with 1.3 
billion Muslim’s worldwide (Nasr p34). Islam is one of three “monotheistic Abrahamic 
faiths,” with the name being derived from an Arabic word meaning submission (CIA 
Factbook). Islam originated with the Prophet Muhammad in 610 when “a heavenly 
messenger, later identified as the Archangel Gabriel, interrupted his meditations and said, 
‘Oh Muhammad, you are the messenger of God’ … the spirit ordered Muhammad to 
‘Recite!’ three times before he composed himself well enough to receive his first 
revelation,” revelations which would eventually form the Quran, the holy book of Islam 
(Bogle p7). In receiving another of his revelations, “Muhammad is said to have 
undergone a miraculous nighttime journey to Jerusalem, followed by an ascent into 
heaven … the huge rock that stands at the center of the Dome of the Rock, an early 
Islamic structure in Jerusalem, is held to be the spot from which the Prophet arose into 
the Divine Presence,” which is why the city of Jerusalem to be the third holiest site to 
Muslims (Gordon p9-10). The message presented by Muhammad was not accepted by 
many at first, and led to persecution until, “in an event known as the Hijra (622), 
Muhammad departed Mecca for the northern town of Yathrib, known henceforth as 
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Medina” (Gordon p10), a move which “transformed Muhammad from a private person 
preaching a new faith to a leader wielding political and military authority. With that 
authority, Muhammad, at the head of a thousand followers, returned triumphantly to 
Mecca in January 630 to claim the city for Islam” (Mackey p43). Muhammad lived for 
two more years after the return to Mecca, and by the time of his death he had, “delivered 
a monotheistic religion containing precise ethical doctrines to most of western Arabia. In 
addition he had established a new community that was in essence an organized and armed 
state governing in the name of religion” (Mackey p43-44). This community of Muslims, 
which has grown from Muhammad to the 1.3 billion adherents today, composes the 
umma.  
              Over the nearly 1400 years since the founding of Islam, there have been several 
splits and derivations, but the most important for this study is the Shia - Sunni split. The 
Sunni branch of Islam represents nearly 75 percent of Muslims worldwide (CIA 
Factbook), while “Shias number from 130 million to 195 million people, or 10 to 15 
percent of the total” (Nasr p34). The two groups split shortly after the death of 
Muhammad “over a religio-political leadership dispute about the rightful successor to 
Muhammad. The Shia believe Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali, was the only 
divinely ordained Imam (religious leader), while the Sunni maintain the first three caliphs 
after Muhammad were also legitimate authorities” (CIA Factbook). The Shia-Sunni split 
is important for this study due to the composition of the resistance movements to be 
discussed, with Hezbollah being a Shiite organization, while Hamas has a predominantly 
Sunni majority.  
              Islam is not just the political and historic entity which has been presented to this 
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point, it also is a system of religious belief. This belief is based on five articles found in a 
Quranic verse of warning which states “Whoever repudiates faith in God, and His angels, 
His books and His messengers, and in the last Day, has indeed gone into error” (Partridge 
p252). Further, Islam in practice centers on the Five Pillars, which are: “the testimony of 
faith (shahada), daily prayer (salah), giving alms (zakah), fasting during Ramadan 
(sawm), and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj)” (CIA Factbook). Both Shiites and Sunnis 
accept these principles, but Shiites also “emphasize divine justice as a core doctrine, as 
well as Imamah, a belief that the true leadership of the umma rests with the family of the 
Prophet through Ali” (Partridge p245). It is through the lens of these beliefs, and this 
historical background, that the question of Islamist resistance to Israel by Hamas and 
Hezbollah will be viewed. 
Chapter Outline 
 The first chapter of this study will serve as an introduction to the remainder of the 
study. It will propose the questions to be examined, as well as discuss how the question 
will be addressed in this study and examine some of the existing literature pertinent to 
this study. Further, it will present some of the key concepts and ideas that will set the 
stage for what will be studied. The second chapter will be a case study, focused on 
Hamas and the Sunni perspective of resistance. It will examine the history of Hamas, its 
resistance to Israel, and the role which religious doctrine has and continues to play in that 
resistance. The third chapter will echo the second, however, it will be focused on 
Hezbollah and the Shiite aspects of this study. The final chapter will examine the findings 
of the two case studies. It will use these assessments and findings to determine and 
explain what may be learned about the role of religious doctrine and thought in 
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resistance. Finally, the fourth chapter will discuss if the findings of this study warrant 
further study into this field of the religious influence on resistance.  
  16 
Chapter 2  
Sunnis and Hamas 
 The first case study in this research project is focused on the conception of the 
umma in Sunni Islam and what role it plays in resistance movements. More specifically, 
this study will examine the resistance organization Hamas, and the question of what role 
Islamic doctrine, particularly that of the umma, plays in framing the policy and action of 
Hamas. This study will require first an investigation of the umma from the Sunni 
perspective, followed by a general overview of Hamas, including the history and 
development of the organization, as well as the role of Islamic doctrine in that 
development. Once an understanding of both the Sunni umma and the development of 
Hamas has been established, it will then be possible to examine the specific role of the 
umma in framing resistance for Hamas. 
Umma in Sunni Islam 
 Islam is a religion with many branches, of which the largest two are Sunni and 
Shia. As mentioned earlier, the Sunni and Shia split over the question of leadership of the 
umma. The Sunni branch is the branch “who reached a compromise, or at least an 
agreement to disagree, on these questions” (Crone p219) of leadership. The resulting 
belief is that leadership is elective, meaning, “that it is an office filled by the community, 
not an individual quality with which God has singled out a particular person above all 
others. Nobody was born an imam; one could not acquire the position without being 
chose by someone else” (Crone p226-227). With this basis of compromise and election, 
the Sunni branch of Islam became the dominant branch and still is, as “the overwhelming 
majority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims are Sunnis” (Nasr p32).   
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 Sunnis and Shias split over the issue of the leadership of the umma, serving as a 
starting point for discussing the conception of the umma in Sunni Islam. The question of 
leadership of the umma is important because, as Tamin Al-Barghouti notes, “the umma is 
the body that follows, the entity that is followed is the ‘Imam’” (Al-Barghouti p38). In 
Sunni Islam, the functions of leadership of the umma   are” the normal functions of the 
political authority, protecting the community against external threats and keeping the law 
and order internally” (Al-Barghouti p44). This view of the leadership of the umma led the 
Sunnis to a view of the umma as a political entity, in which Sunnis “attached enormous 
importance to communal togetherness, and this they showed in their treatment of rebels 
too” (Crone p229-230). A prominent Sunni theologian, Mawardi (972-1058 CE), wrote 
that when there is a conflict in the umma, “Muslim rebels are still Muslims,” and that 
“both of them are still part of the umma despite the fact that they do not agree” (Al-
Barghouti p49). All this indicates that the Sunni conception of the umma is one of a 
political unit composed of all Muslims, despite disagreements that may exist among 
them.  
B.A. Roberson notes that this view of the umma among Sunnis extends into 
fundamentalists2 through the Muslim Brotherhood, who “proclaimed the unity of all 
Muslims, and of the umma, and established branches in different countries, which survive 
to this day (one of the most recently established being the Movement of Islamic 
Resistance, haraka al-muqawama al-islamiya, or HAMAS, in 1987, in Palestine)” 
                                                           
22 Fundmentalism and Islamism: In this study, the terms fundamentalism and Islamism will be used. There 
is a lack of consensus regarding the meanings and usage of these terms. For the purposes of this study, 
fundamentalism and Islamism are being used to describe systems of thought that seek to employ Islam as 
the sole solutions to the issues of contemporary life, whether those are social, political, economic, etc. 
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(Roberson p34). Fundamentalist Sunni Islam goes a step further than the umma simply 
being a singular political unit in a belief that “the loyalty of a citizen of an Islamic state 
does not lie in that state; rather his loyalty is to the Muslim umma” (Al-Barghouti p72). 
Thus, the view of the umma for the Sunni is a single, transnational political entity 
composed of all Muslims, an entity that trumps all other ties or obligations. Now that the 
concept of the umma in Sunni Islam has been established, it is necessary to examine 
Hamas as a movement within the Sunni branch of Islam.   
Leading to Hamas 
 Hamas as an organization emerged at the onset of the First Intifada in December 
8, 1987, though its First Communique was dated December 14, 1987, praising the 
Intifada and resistance, while condemning the “Zionists” and partial peace settlements 
(Hroub 2000, p36, p265). The name of the organization, Hamas, is “both an acronym for 
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement) and an Arabic word 
meaning ‘zeal’” (Levitt, 2008 p8).  While Hamas was founded in 1987, one must go 
further back to trace the development of the organization because “Hamas was 
established as the ‘paramilitary’ wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, the roots of 
which, in turn, lie in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood” (Gunning p26).  The Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna “as a movement for 
education and reform of ‘heart and mind’. But the movement soon developed a political 
dimension calling for an Islamic reform of state and government” (Nusse p12-13). The 
Muslim Brotherhood established its first branches in Palestine during the mid 1940s and 
grew quickly to the point that “by 1947, there were thirty eight branches and over 10,000 
registered members, drawn from both the ruling elite and the lower classes” but were 
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divided by the creation of Israel in 1948 with the Gaza Strip under Egyptian rule and the 
West Bank becoming part of Jordan (Gunning p26-27).  Khaled Hroub notes that this 
division weakened the bond between those in the West Bank and Gaza, and as a result, 
“the Brethren in the Gaza strip took on revolutionary and military traits, the Brethren in 
the West Bank adopted a political and educational approach” (Hroub 2000, 20).  
This split also saw a lull in activity from 1948 to 1967, during which “in Egypt, 
the group was suppressed, and in Jordan the Islamists were both tolerated and co-opted 
(to such an extent that, in the 1950s, the Brotherhood sided with the Jordanian regime 
against secular Palestinian groups)” (Levitt 2008, p 20).  Egyptian suppression of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza resulted from a conflict with the secular leader of Egypt, 
Gamal Nasser, under whose rule “the movement was banned and declared illegal, and 
those Brothers who were not jailed went underground” (Hroub 2000, p23). At the same 
time the Gazan Brotherhood saw a decline in influence as Nasser promoted a popular 
pan-Arabic ideology with “themes such as Arab nationalism, Arab unity, socialism, and 
the liberation of Palestine” while “the Brotherhood, by contrast, put less emphasis on 
these themes, focusing more on Islam as a frame of reference and as an aspect of 
identity” (Jensen p14). While the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood was weakened and 
driven underground, the branch in the West Bank was incorporated into Jordan, and 
“became a political, educational, and proselytizing organization that avoided any real 
military activities” with weak nationalist tendencies (Hroub 2000, p20). During this 
period of inactivity as a resistance movement, the Brotherhood in the West Bank 
“focused in welfare and local politics, participating in municipal and national elections, 
and winning parliamentary seats” (Gunning p28). The period incorporation of the West 
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Bank Brotherhood into Jordan and suppression of the Brotherhood in Gaza came to an 
end in 1967. 
In 1967, Arab forces led by Egypt’s Nasser suffered a demoralizing defeat in the 
Six Day’s War at the hands of Israel. This defeat led to the end of the ideological 
dominance of Arab nationalism, and “consolidated within Palestinian political thought 
the ideas of self reliance and the pursuit of popular liberation strategies rather than 
dependence on regular Arab armies” (Hroub 2000, p29). This saw the emergence of 
Palestinian nationalism and re-emergence of Islamism as “Gaza and the West Bank we 
re-united under one sovereign power, facilitating the emergence of a indigenous, 
territories-wide Palestinian leadership” (Gunning p29). This reunification of the 
territories, though under Israeli domination, saw a reunification of the Palestinian 
Brotherhood, which initially “re-emerged as a modest charitable network, rather than a 
political faction” (Gunning p30). The period between the defeat of Arab Nationalism in 
1967 and the emergence of Hamas in 1987 can be split into four stages for the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood (Levitt 2008, p22). The first period was from 1967 to 1975, during 
which there was “a campaign to build mosques and to ‘mobilize, unite, reorient, and 
consolidate the faith of a new generation so as to prepare it for the confrontation with 
Zionism’” (Hroub 2000, p30). The second stage came from 1976 through the mid 1980s, 
which could be called “the phase of social institution building, reflecting the formation of 
Islamic student societies, clubs, and charitable societies that became the meeting point for 
the new Islamic youth” (Hroub 2000, p31). The third stage overlaps the second from 
1981 to 1987 and saw the growth of “political influence through the establishment of the 
mechanisms of action and preparation for armed struggle” while the fourth stage is the 
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launching of Hamas in 1987 (Levitt 2008, p22). The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood 
saw a cessation of its operations with the creation of Hamas as all the political and 
charitable affiliates of the Brotherhood came under the umbrella of Hamas. 
The Charter of Hamas 
Hamas was founded on December 8, 1987, and on August 18, 1988 distributed its 
Charter, a document “manifesting its form, unveiling its identity, stating its position, 
clarifying its expectations, discussing its hopes, and calling for aid, support, and 
members” (Maqdsi p123). The Charter is composed of thirty-six articles in five chapters, 
which interweave nationalistic and Islamic principles, which are of importance for this 
study.  
The first chapter of the charter is composed of eight articles, and serves as an 
introduction to the movement. In these articles, Hamas identifies itself as an Islamic 
resistance movement born out of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood consisting of all 
Muslims loyal to Allah who know their obligations to themselves, Allah and country 
welcoming all who “adopt its doctrines and ideology, enact its program, guard its secrets 
and desire to join its ranks” (Maqdsi p123). Hamas marks itself as an international 
organization, due to the international nature of Islam, dedicated to the liberation of the 
entire territory of Palestine as a “link in [a long] chain of the Jihad3 against the Zionist 
occupation” (Maqdsi p124), with the use of the term Jihad in this instance is to indicate 
an armed struggle. The chapter ends with the motto for Hamas:   
“Allah is its Goal. 
The Messenger is its Leader. 
The Quran is its Constitution. 
                                                           
3 See Appendix on Concept of Jihad for discussion of topic and explanation for why it is not discussed in 
greater depth at this point. 
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Jihad is its methodology, and 
Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire” (Maqdsi p124). 
The second chapter of the Charter of Hamas consists of two articles outlining the 
goals of the organization. This is done is broad language, stating a desire to restore and 
proclaim an Islamic state and effect change. In so doing, Hamas declares it “will be a 
support to the weak, a victor to the oppressed” (Maqdsi p125).  
The third chapter of the charter covers articles 11 through 22, and specifies the 
strategy and means to accomplish the broadly stated goals. In this, Hamas identifies the 
land of Palestine as an “Islamic Waqf [Trust] upon all Muslim generations till the day of 
Resurrection (Maqdsi p125), and as a result, the full territory of Palestine is to be an 
Islamic state, achieved through Jihad rather than peace settlements. It goes on to state that 
Palestine is to be liberated through three spheres, Palestinian, Arabic, and Islamic, and 
that it is “obligatory for every Muslim, no matter where he is” (Maqdsi p126). It is in this 
chapter that Hamas first appeals to the Umma in the effort to liberate Palestine through 
both material support and education, which will “instill in the minds of the Muslim 
generation that the Palestinian cause is a religious cause” (Maqdsi p127).  The chapter 
then explains the roles that women and the arts play in the support of the Palestinian 
cause, and the importance of social welfare to those in need throughout the entire 
Palestinian population. It concludes with a condemnation of Zionism and its international 
supporters. 
The fourth chapter of the Charter of Hamas explains the positions Hamas takes on 
other Palestinian movements, Arab and Islamic governments, people of other faiths, and 
the Palestinian people. The charter makes a distinction between Islamic and nationalistic 
movements, offering full support to Islamic movements, while reserving the right to 
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dispute nationalist movements that are loyal to other states (Maqdsi p129-130). Hamas 
devotes a separate article to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), labeling it as 
a father or brother, but stating, “secularist ideology is in total contradiction to religious 
ideologies, and it is upon ideology that positions, actions, and decisions are made,” 
therefore Hamas cannot partner with the PLO unless there is a change in the PLO’s 
ideology (Maqdsi p130-131). Here again, Hamas clarifies the importance of Islam and its 
doctrine in all aspects of its operations. The charter then calls on Arab and Muslim 
governments to be open to supporting the liberation of Palestine, appealing to the umma 
in the areas of supplying fighters, “educating the Islamic people ideologically, morally, 
and culturally in order to plays its role in the battle for liberation”, as well as creating 
media support for the struggle (Maqdsi p131). This chapter also calls for people of other 
faiths to not fight against Islam, as it provides a shadow for peace among the adherents of 
different religions (Maqdsi p 132). The chapter ends with a claim that Zionists have 
attempted to divide the umma through peace settlements with Arab states, and warns of 
the dangers of such actions, as well as the need to unite for the Palestinian cause (Maqdsi 
p132-133). Throughout this chapter, the importance of Islamic doctrine, particularly in 
uniting the umma to the cause of the liberation of Palestine, is emphasized. 
The final chapter of the Charter of Hamas provides the framework of history 
through which Hamas views itself. In it, Hamas identifies itself as the continuation of the 
soldiers who fought for the cause of Islam during the Crusades (Maqdsi p133-134). 
Hamas states that in the Crusades, “the Muslims did not get Palestine back until they 
gathered under their religious banner and united together, glorified their lord, and took 
off as Mujahids,” a course of action that must be duplicated for the liberation of Palestine 
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(Maqdsi p133). In this concluding chapter, Hamas again declares the necessity of unity 
among the umma in to reach their goal of an Islamic state in Palestine. 
This has provided an overview of the thirty-six articles that comprise the five 
chapters of the Charter of Hamas. The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate the 
importance of Islamic doctrine, particularly that of the umma, in the founding of Hamas. 
It is this foundation that set the stage for the policies and actions of Hamas that would 
follow. This also provides an insight into the ideology of Hamas, which is an important 
facet in this study. 
Hamas Since the Charter 
 The Charter of Hamas was useful for Hamas at its onset for the purposes of 
“manifesting its form, unveiling its identity, stating its position, clarifying its 
expectations, discussing its hopes, and calling for aid, support, and members” (Maqdsi 
p12). In the more than two decades following the publication of the Charter, Hamas has 
risen to become a powerful movement in the Palestinian territories. That rise will be 
examined to provide deeper insight into Hamas and show how Islamic doctrines have 
guided the movement.  
 Hamas was founded during the First Intifada. Beyond simply being founded 
during the First Intifada, “Hamas claimed to have started the uprising that broke out in 
December 1987 in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. It was Hamas members who sprea 
the movement to the West Bank. Frequently, Hamas was described as the ‘head’ of the 
Intifada” (Nusse p68).  The First Intifada has been referred to vaguely up to this point, 
and clarification is necessary. Intifada translates to “uprising” (Gunning p34) and the 
First Intifada describes the period from 1987 through 1993 during which  “Palestinians 
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from all walks of life—youth, merchants, labourers, women and children—joined 
massive demonstrations, economic boycotts, tax resistance and strikes, protesting the 
military occupation of their land and demanding national independence” (Tharoor p3). 
The First Intifada came to an end in 1993 when the leadership of the PLO signed of the 
Oslo Agreement with Israel, an agreement Hamas saw as a insulting to the Palestinian 
people and the Intifada by “squandering those efforts in the theatrics of settlement” 
(Hroub 2000, p81). 
 While the Oslo Agreement was a negotiated truce between the PLO and Israel, 
Hamas did not follow the truce. Since the agreements, Hamas has become known for 
terrorist attacks, particularly suicide bombers, the first of which occurred in April 1993 
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/15268/). Between 1989 and 2000, “Hamas carried out at 
least twenty-seven attacks, including twelve suicide bombings and three failed bombings. 
These attacks caused approximately 185 deaths and left over 1,200 people wounded” 
(Levitt 2008, p12).  
 On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel’s Likud party, with “about 
a thousand Israeli police and soldiers, strode into Jerusalem’s Haram al-Sharif (the 
“Noble Sanctuary”) in a gesture designed to assert his right as an Israeli to visit the 
Muslim holy place” (Said p27). The presence of Sharon served as “the spark that ignites a 
round of fighting, dubbed the ‘second intifada’ by Palestinians,” lasting from September 
2000 until 2005, during which , “according to B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, 
the violence claimed the lives of 1,050 Israelis and 3,358 Palestinians”  
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/15268/).  The Second Intifada came to an end in 2005 
following Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Hamas agreed to a cease fire, two 
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events which allowed Hamas to claim “having done more for Palestinian state building 
than the peace process” and showed a openness of Hamas towards a two state system 
(Gunning p52). The results of the Second Intifada increased the popularity of Hamas 
while showing a level of moderation, which fed election victories for Hamas. In January 
2005, Hamas won 77 of 118 contested seats in municipal elections in the Gaza Strip, and 
in January 2006, “Hamas candidates won 74 seats in the 132-member Palestinian 
parliament,” taking control of the Palestinian Authority (Jensen p43). The victory of 
Hamas caused “the United States, the European Union, and other international donors to 
suspend aid to the Palestinian Authority,” decisions that would see in June 2007, the 
collapse of a shared power agreement between Hamas and Fatah with Fatah forming “a 
new government in Ramallah, which is quickly recognized by the United States and 
European Union,” while Hamas controlled Gaza (http://www.cfr.org/publication/15268/). 
With Hamas in control of Gaza, “Israel sealed off its borders, causing businesses 
to wither. Hamas remained defiant, and increased the rate of rocket attacks against border 
communities within Israel,” leading retaliation by both sides, and a June 2008 truce  
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/hamas/index.html). 
The truce ended on December 19, 2008, which led to strikes by both Hamas and Israel, 
leading to January 3, 2009 when, “Israel opened a ground war, sending tanks and troops 
across the border into Gaza,” which lasted until January 18, 2009, “a devastating 23-day 
battle in which more than 1,300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis died” 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/hamas/index.html). 
Hamas remains in control of Gaza, and “has suspended its use of rockets and shifted 
focus to winning support at home and abroad through cultural initiatives and public 
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relations” in an attempt to build a “culture of resistance” (El-Khodary and Bronner). 
Hamas and Islam 
The Charter of Hamas explicitly defines the organization as an Islamic movement.  
Placing Hamas within the realm of Islam is necessary for this study, as it seeks to use 
Hamas and Hezbollah as indicators for Islamic resistance movements across the Sunni – 
Shia divide. Hamas, represents the Sunni branch of Islam in the study. This is due to the 
position of Hamas as a resistance movement within Palestine, which consists of the 
territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to estimates, the population of 
the Gaza Strip is 99.3 percent Muslim, while the West Bank is 75 percent Muslim, with 
both of Muslim populations predominantly Sunni Muslim (CIA Factbook). This indicates 
that the population from which Hamas draws its members is mainly Sunni. Further, 
Matthew Levitt notes that the Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Muslim group, and “Hamas 
never fully broke off from the Brotherhood. It is not a splinter group; rather it is the 
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Levitt 2008, p30). With this 
identification of Hamas as a Sunni Muslim group, it becomes possible to look at the 
connection of the umma to the policies and practices of Hamas. As was marked 
throughout the glimpse of the Charter of Hamas, the umma is frequently alluded to in the 
rhetoric of Hamas, while Hamas has operated through Islamic institutions. In examining 
the continued role of Islamic doctrine, especially the umma, in Hamas, more current 
statements from Hamas will be examined, as well as the activities of Hamas. 
The documents to be examined are linked to the 2006 parliament elections, and 
are outlined by Khaled Hroub in “New Hamas Through Its New Documents. The first 
document to examine is the 2006 Platform for Change and Reform, which stated the 
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beliefs of Hamas for the 2006 Palestinian parliament elections. In its statement of 
principles, Hamas claims “Historic Palestine is part of the Arab and Islamic land and its 
ownership by the Palestinian people is a right that does not diminish over time. No 
military or legal measures will change that right” and that “The Palestinian people, 
wherever they reside, constitute a single and united people and form an integral part of 
the Arab and Muslim nation” (Hroub 2006, 9). Such claims are based in Hamas’ 
conception of the umma as a singular political unit that may not be dissolved. While “the 
language of the electoral platform overall is secular and bureaucratic, the religious 
references that it does contain fuelled suspicions (arising from Hamas's origins and 
history)” (Hroub 2006, p14-15), and help to demonstrate the underlying influence of 
Islamic doctrine, particularly the umma, in the ideology of Hamas.  
A second document is the proposal by Hamas for the National Unity Government 
Program. This document contains thirty-nine articles, which are centered “around the 
concept of the two-state solution without a hint of the "liberation of the entire land of 
Palestine" or "the destruction of Israel" found in the charter” (Hroub 2006, p16-17). 
According to Hroub, the platform is limited in its references to Islam, however, those few 
references are based in the idea of the umma in that they call for support from Islamic 
community. These references are found in article 12, which calls for "asserting our Arab 
and Islamic dimension and activating the support of our Arab and Islamic nations for our 
people and its just cause in all aspects,” a call that is echoed in the thirteenth and thirty-
seventh articles (Hroub 2006, 19). Through the proposal for a unity government it is clear 
that an appeal to the umma for support of the Palestinian cause remains a key component 
of the ideology of Hamas. 
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 The third document identified is the cabinet platform, which was delivered on 
March 27, 2006 by Prime Minister elect Ismail Haniyeh, and “represents Hamas alone, 
having been drafted after the collapse of the national unity negotiations when there was 
no longer any need to make concessions to the factions” (Hroub 2006, p19). In his 
explanation of the document, Hroub notes that Haniyeh outlined seven challenges that 
would compose the agenda of Hamas in power, the sixth of which is “raising the status of 
the Palestinian question at the Arab and Islamic levels,” (Hroub 2006, p23) yet another 
appeal to the necessity of support among the umma for Palestine. In this document, the 
call for support from the umma has shifted from a call to resistance to a call for 
investment, asking “Palestinian Arab and Muslim entrepreneurs to come to Palestine and 
discover investment opportunities in various sector of the economy” (Hroub 2006, p24). 
In this document, as well as the other two, “the references to Islam are general, having to 
do either with the nature of Palestinian society … or in relation to the Palestinian cause” 
(Hroub 2006, p26). In this, the scaling back of Islamic doctrine from the explicitly stated 
ideology of Hamas has not included a retreat from appeals to the umma for support.  
 Aside from ideological statements appealing to the umma, Hamas has placed 
Islam at the center of its activity since its inception. While the Charter of Hamas appealed 
to Islam and identified the movement as specifically Palestinian and Muslim, much of the 
building of Hamas has come through institutions of Islam. According to Jeroen Gunning, 
“many activists are recruited through the mosque, and Hamas’ emphasis on Islam is an 
important recruiting factor” (Gunning p200), with a study of jailed members finding 
“almost 50 percent cite the mosque, Moslem Brotherhood, or other religious influence as 
central” to recruitment (Levitt 2008, p83). Beyond using the Islamic community and 
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institutions as grounds for recruiting, in his book Hamas, Matthew Levitt notes that 
Hamas uses Islamic charities to “offer a veil of legitimacy for terrorist fundraising” 
through social welfare groups which “engender grassroots support for said groups and 
create fertile spotting and recruiting grounds” (Levitt 2008, p62). In addition to “the tens 
of millions of dollars raised by Hamas each year from foreign charities, individuals, 
businesses, and criminal enterprises, the terrorist organization is also a massive 
beneficiary of support from foreign governments … Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, 
Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Qatar” (Levitt 2008, p171). This demonstration of the funding 
of Hamas reveals another way that the practice of Hamas looks to the umma. In its appeal 
to Islamic charities and Muslim majority states (a point which Levitt expounds upon in 
Chapter 3, 6, and 7 of Hamas), it is clear that Hamas considers the umma an important 
contributor to any action it takes, and therefore a necessary component of all of its 
operations. It may also be seen in these appeals that the umma is not forced to act. While 
Hamas appeals to the unity of the umma and the obligation that should accompany that 
unity, in each case, action by the umma is requested, not compelled. This implies that the 
members of the umma possess a degree of free will. 
Conclusions 
 In this study, the Sunni conception of the umma has been presented, as has the 
history, development, and current position of Hamas. Through this study, it has become 
clear that the umma is an important factor for Hamas both ideologically and 
operationally. While many of the Islamic factors that were prevalent at the founding of 
Hamas have faded from its ideological statements, references to the importance of, and 
need for support from, the umma have remained. Beyond appealing to the umma, Hamas 
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has also demonstrated a reliance on the umma for support, politically and financially. In 
all this it may be seen that for a Sunni resistance movement such as Hamas, the umma is 
a necessary component.  
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Chapter Three  
 Shias and Hezbollah 
The second of the case studies in this research project is focused on the 
conception of the umma in the Shia branch of Islam, and the role it plays in resistance 
movement. Particularly, this study will examine the resistance movement Hezbollah, and 
the question of what role the Islamic doctrine of the umma plays in framing its policies 
and actions. In order to execute of this study, it will be necessary to differentiate the Shia 
conception of the umma from the Sunni, which will require a look into the history of the 
Shia branch of Islam. Additionally, a general overview of Hezbollah will be required, 
including the history and development of Hezbollah and the role of Islamic doctrine in 
development. Once all this has been accomplished, it will be possible to examine the role 
of the umma is in framing resistance for Hezbollah. 
Umma in Shia Islam 
Shia Islam is the largest minority Muslim group and “number from 130 million to 
195 million people, or 10 to 15 percent of the total” (Nasr p34). The Shia branch of Islam 
may be traced nearly to the founding of Islam, to the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 
632 AD, when “the question of succession became the main issue over which Muslims 
disagreed” (Al-Barghouti p14). In choosing the next leader of the umma, Abu Bakr was 
selected by consensus, though “a small group of the Prophet’s companions believed that 
the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, was more qualified for the job 
and that it had been the wish of the Prophet that he lead the Muslim community” (Nasr 
p35). Despite this disagreement, Abu Bakr was the second leader of the umma, followed 
by Umar, and Uthman before Ali would ascend to leadership, though a small group 
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maintained their support of Ali (Waines p155). This group became known as “Shi’at Ali, 
the partisans of Ali, or just the Partisans (Shi’a/Shiites)” (Al-arghouti p16), and came to 
the understanding that “Ali had been designated by God, in the Quran and by the Prophet, 
through his sayings, to become the Prophet’s successor” (Al-Barghouti p17).  
Due to the assassination of Uthman, which led to Ali becoming the leader of the 
umma, a civil war between Ali’s supporters and those supporting Uthman’s cousin 
Muawiya, marred Ali’s rule, and after failed attempts at arbitration, “ended only when 
Ali was assassinated by angry extremists who blamed both him and Muawiya for the 
crisis” (Nasr p36). The failure of arbitration and the resulting violence, led to the Shias 
“establishing a theory of divine duty and right of the chosen successor of the Prophet and 
his descendants to rule and guide the community of Muslims, independent of that 
community’s consensus” (Al-Barghouti p17). Beyond this theory, Shias came to believe 
that “Muslims had erred in choosing their leaders, and that error had mired their faith in 
violence and confusion. The dissenting voices rejected the legitimacy of the first three 
Rightly Guided Caliphs, arguing that God would not entrust his religion to ordinary 
mortals chosen by the vote of the community” (Nasr p37). This belief was reinforced by 
the leadership of the Caliphs following Ali, Muawiya and Yazid, who created the basis of 
the Umayyad Dynasty and excesses caused “the heart of Islam had been ripped out” 
while “Arabs consolidated their power from the borders of India to North Africa” 
(Geaves p104).  
The greatest offense of the Umayyad Dynasty came under the rule of Yazid, and 
to this day is marked by Shias as Ashura, when on the tenth day of Muharram, Shias 
practice “collective atonement through lamentation and self-flagellation” (Nasr 32). The 
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day commemorates the day that Hussain, the son of Ali and grandson of Muhammad, and 
his force of 72 men were met near Karbala by an army of over five thousand had their 
water supplies cut off after six days of fighting, and “bravely charged the much larger 
Umayyad army, only to be cut down and massacred. The fallen were beheaded; their 
bodies left to rot in the scorching heat of the desert, and their heads were mounted on 
staffs” (Nasr p41). The brutality of these actions horrified many within the umma, and 
galvanized the Shia view of the Umayyad Dynasty and the Sunni community “As 
representative of an illegitimate and degenerate empire that could never be the true 
people of God” (Geaves p107). The martyrdom of Hussain added to the previous failure 
of arbitration between Ali and Muawiya led to a belief in the failure of the umma and 
necessity for divine selection of leadership, and became the basis for the “Shiite doctrine 
of the fallibility of the Umma and the infallibility of the Imam” (Al-Barghouti p18).  
During the Umayyad Dynasty, the Shia did not accept the legitimacy of the 
Caliphate, and instead followed the “teachings of the descendents of Ali and Hussein, 
who succeeded one another on the basis of the father choosing his successor from among 
his sons. Those Imams did not have the actual political power under the Umayyad rulers, 
rather they had moral authority of being models to their followers” (Al Barghouti p 22). 
There is disagreement among Shias as to the number of imams from the line of Ali as 
“succession crises through the ages led to offshoots that broke away from the main body 
of Shiism – also known as Twelvers, for recognizing twelve imams” (Nasr p75). Each of 
the offshoots would come to be known by the number of the last Imam, and in each of 
these sects, “whenever a line of succession ended, the last Imam in the line was 
considered the Messiah, the Mahdi, the leader who ‘would return at the end of the time to 
  35 
fill the world with justice as it was filled with injustice.’ The last of those Imams was 
Mohammad son of Hasson, the twelfth in the line of succession from Ali” (Al-Barghouti 
p23). It is believed that the Mohammad succeeded his father at the age of five, but that 
“God hid the Twelfth Imam from physical access in order to preserve his life,” and that 
during the period of his hiddenness, “the Twelfth Imam is the unseen Lord of the Age 
(imam al-zaman), the permanent imam until the Day of Judgment” (Nasr p67). 
Anticipation of the return of the hidden imam has become a part of Shia doctrine and in 
Shiism is “part of the belief in the correct interpretation of the Quran,” a lack of belief in 
which does not mean one is not “a Muslim, only a misguided one according to Shiite 
doctrine” (Al-Barghouti p44). Thus, though Sunnis are misguided in their beliefs, they 
are still part of the umma.  
Following the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Shia declined in political 
influence, and the view of the Shia gradually became that rather than a ruler of the umma, 
the hidden Imam was merely a guide that Muslims must choose to follow, and “his 
powerlessness thus becomes essential in his functions as a guide rather than a benevolent 
enforcer” (al-Barghouti p45). The Shia view that the Imam was the only legitimate 
authority faced the questions of leadership, and concluded that “in a case where the Imam 
was prevented from assuming his rightful authority, the interfering power was rendered 
illegitimate, and the ruler ‘unjust’ (al-ja'ir*) and ‘unrighteous’ (al-zalim*)” (Sachedina 
p98). This illustrates the principle of the just ruler necessary for the leadership of the 
umma to the Shia, a principle Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina describes as requiring 
obedience to the just ruler, the deputy of the Imam, and disobedience to the unjust ruler 
(or usurper) as obedience to God (Sachedina p 99). While these obligations were placed 
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upon the Shia, their decline in power and influence made challenging the Sunni caliphate 
an impossibility. In these conditions, the goal of the Shia became “to keep the faith until 
the imam’s return. Passive resistance replaced active rebellion. Shias would not recognize 
the legitimacy of Sunni rule, but they would not directly challenge it either” (Nasr p72). 
While under Sunni rule, but unable to challenge it and, “with the occultation of the last 
Imam, as we shall see, the jurists became the sole leaders of the Shi'a, and their guardians 
in all matters affecting their lives” (Sachedina p 49). The traditional view holds that the 
jurists have guardianship over three areas of community life: first, “over the persons and 
property of those who might otherwise be victimized,” second “over property and 
activities upon which the religious life of the community depends,” and third “over the 
welfare of the Muslim community, encompassing the responsibility of serving as a social 
force” (Rose p169).  
This view of the jurists acting as deputies and guardians was challenged by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who wrote, “after the Occultation, the just faqih has the same 
authority that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams had … here we are not speaking 
of status, but rather of function. By ‘authority’ we mean government, the administration 
of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the shari‘a” (Khomeini 
p62). In this, Khomeini notes that the leadership of the umma should fall to the faqih, that 
is “in the absence of the Imam, the scholars, the best qualified interpreters of the text, and 
therefore the traditional legislators of the Umma, should also inherit his executive 
powers” (Al-Barghouti p45). In arriving at such a conclusion, Khomeini reazlied “there is 
nothing in the rulings of the Imamite jurists to prevent jurists from assuming the authority 
(wilaya*) invested in them indirectly by the twelfth Imam,” which could allow the jurist 
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to become the just ruler (Sachedina p118). In so doing, Khomeini brought about “the 
transformation of Shi’ism from a religio-political tradition into a revolutionary ideology” 
(Rose p167). This transformation found in the thought of Khomeini described an ideal 
Shia government, which tends “to regard velayat-e faqih as licensing jurisprudents to rule 
in the imam’s place with his full powers during the occultation” (Rose p176). While there 
was support for such a claim in the Shia tradition, Khomeini was the first to express and 
exercise such views. 
With all of this, the view of the umma in Shia Islam is similar to that of Sunni 
Islam, in that it is a political unit. However, in the Shia conception, religious scholars 
rather than simply one who is fit to rule should undertake the leadership of the umma. 
Thus, the religious dynamics of Islam are equated to the political dynamics in the Shia 
conception of the umma.  
The Shia of Lebanon 
Now that the development of Shia Islam, and the conception of the umma in it, 
has been discussed, it is possible to examine the history and development of Hezbollah. 
In order to examine the development of Hezbollah, and understanding of the country of 
Lebanon, Hezbollah’s country of origin, and the Shia of Lebanon, is necessary. This 
section will examine the dynamics of Lebanon that helped to spawn Hezbollah, as well as 
the origins of the organization itself. 
Lebanon did not exist as a political unit until after World War I, when “France 
acquired a mandate over the northern portion of the former Ottoman Empire province of 
Syria. The French separated out the region of Lebanon in 1920, and granted this area 
independence in 1943” (CIA Factbook). In this territory, there is no religious majority, 
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with large populations of Christian Maronites, Sunnis, and Shias, and the government of 
Lebanon was designed to reflect this plurality. Due to census statistics at the founding of 
Lebanon, “Sunni-Maronite domination of the political system, in which virtually all 
significant offices –from parliamentary seats to senior army and bureaucratic posts - were 
distributed according to confessional – which is to say, ascriptive sectarian-criteria,” 
(Norton p110-111) establishing a system in which Shias were practically disenfranchised 
politically. Under this system, “the Maronites were accorded the presidency and the 
Sunnis the prime ministership, while the Shiites were only allocated the post of 
parliamentary Speaker, a position richer traditionally in patronage possibilities than 
significant political power” (Norton p111).  This system saw the Shia in Lebanon remain 
impoverished politically “despite a half-century's demographic changes, which saw the 
Shiites replace the Maronites as the largest confessional group in Lebanon,” a reality 
reflected by the Shias underdevelopment economically and socially  (Norton p111). The 
underdeveloped Shia community of Lebanon could be divided into three groups, the 
“elite, the ‘Zuama,’ included the members of the rich families in the south and in Beqaa. 
The religious elite, the ‘Ulema,’ included the members of the families comprising the 
Shiite religious establishment, some holding a distinguished familial pedigree. The third 
stratum included all the peasants, laborers, and small merchants” (Azani p49). The 
demographics of Lebanon began to evolve in the 1960’s with “the transition from the 
village to the city, changes in the natural increase in the various communities, 
immigration, the impacts of modernization, and the appearance of new players in the 
Lebanese arena,” all of which served to elevate the status of the Shia in Lebanon and to 
break down the three classes of Shia society (Azani p51).  
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The rise of Lebanese Shia was mirrored by the rise of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, who 
became one of the most influential political leaders and was “courted by the Maronite 
Christians, who saw him as a reasonable and intelligent reformer committed to Lebanon, 
and the PLO, which recognized his growing influence among the Shiites,” a courtship 
which allowed him to shift alliances as he saw necessary (Norton p113).  The shifting of 
alliances by al-Sadr can be traced to “an interest not to destabilize the fragile foundations 
on which the Lebanese state stood, and on the other hand, the discrimination of the 
community by the state,” which required undertaking actions beneficial to the Shia 
community (Azani p54). Lebanon’s 1975 civil war nearly derailed the efforts of al-Sadr, 
as his “movement was one of social protest, and the din of battle almost smothered it” 
(Norton p114), while at the same time, “the collapse of the state and the resulting 
violence took a tremendous toll on the Shi‘ite community, producing another cycle of 
demographic, social, and economic dislocation” (Hamzeh p14). The 1975 Lebanese civil 
war was the first in a line of paradigm shifting events for the Shia in Lebanon, and “the 
cataclysmic succession of events – civil war, Israel’s 1978 invasion and Sadr’s 
disappearance – was capped by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The fate of Sadr and 
triumph of Shia Islam under Khomeini, at a time of civil ferment in Lebanon was a potent 
political and theological cocktail for the Lebanese Shiites” (Jaber p13-14). These events 
helped to foment religious radicalism in Lebanon, and combined with the mysterious 
disappearance of the moderate al-Sadr saw his political movement, Harakat al-Mahrumin, 
which translates to the Movement of the Deprived, give “way to a political organization 
and militia, Amal (Hope), which dominated Shia politics until Hezbollah” (Nasr p85).  
Following years of political and social repression, a short period of relief and political 
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awakening, and a civil war and foreign invasion that negated any gains made by the Shia 
of Lebanon, the stage was set for the emergence of Hezbollah.  
 Hezbollah emerged out of Amal in 1982. Amal, which translates to hope, is an 
acronym for “Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah, or Battlions of the Lebanese 
Resistance” (Hamzeh p21). Amal was founded by al-Sadr shortly after the outbreak of 
the civil war as the military arm of the Movement of the Deprived, because he believed 
“that in the 1970s Lebanon it was no longer possible to maintain political power without 
military might and that, in a violence-saturated environment, a militia was an existential 
necessity for the survival of the community” (Azani p55). The emergence of a Shia 
militia positioned Amal to take the political lead of Lebanese Shia, however, in 1978 al-
Sadr never returned from a trip to Libya, and “in the wake of al-Sadr’s disappearance, 
Amal experienced factionalization and militancy” (Hamzeh p23). Despite this splintering, 
“on the eve of the Israeli invasion of 1982 it was undoubtedly the most important Shiite 
political movement in Lebanon” (Norton p116), but the invasion served to be to great of 
an obstacle for the Amal movement without the charismatic leadership of al-Sadr. 
Following al-Sadr, Nabih Berri rose to the position of leadership of Amal, and he 
“succeeded in steering Amal away from its clerical origins to a more secular platform” 
(Jaber p14). This move to a moderate position furthered the rift in the Shia community, 
and helped define two groups in the community, “the pragmatic and moderate majority, 
regarding itself as part of the Lebanese state and working toward changing the regime on 
the basis of the accepted rules of the game, and the extremist minority, denying the 
legitimacy of the secular and pro-Western Lebanese regime and working toward its 
overthrow in a revolutionary act” (Azani p59). This more militant group identified with 
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the revolutionary message of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran in 1979, and “as a result, Sayyid Husayn al-Musawi, a member of Amal’s 
command council, broke away in June 1982, and founded Islamic Amal,” which would 
grow into Hezbollah (Hamzeh p23).  
 When Hezbollah was founded, the “initial goal was to launch a revolt against the 
Israeli occupation,” but this soon expanded to “embrace the task of ridding Lebanon from 
the presence of Western forces and influences. These aims would be conducted under the 
banner of Islam, with the sponsorship of Iran and with the blessing of Syria” (Jaber p20-
21). From ts outset, Hezbollah has been closely tied to Iran, as “its fighters were trained 
by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,” who enabled Hezbollah’s militia as it “quickly 
developed into a lethel and highly organized military force, far more radical in its views 
than Amal – committed to pan-Islamic revolution” (Nasr p114-115). While Hezbollah 
was organizationally conceived in 1982, it was not until February 1985 that the views of 
the organization came into view, when “Hezbollah formally announced its existence in an 
‘Open Letter’ – a political manifesto that outlined the party’s aims and ideology” (Noe 
p5). This document provides an insight to the founding of Hezbollah, as well as a point of 
origin for the progression of Hezbollah’s development.  
Hezbollah’s Open Letter 
As with the study of Hamas, a look into the foundational document of Hezbollah 
is necessary to understand the organization. As previously noted, the Open Letter of 
Hezbollah was released in February 1985. While “this letter is a programmatic document 
rather than explanation of the components of Hizbullah’s ideology,” (Hamzeh p27), it 
does reveal the general leaning of the organization at it’s founding. The document 
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identifies the identity, fight, and objectives of Hezbollah, as well as addressing external 
communities. This portion of the study will outline and highlight some of the notable 
aspects of this document. 
The Open Letter begins by clarifying the identity of Hezbollah. This is stated in 
the opening of the letter by the explanation “We are the sons of the umma (Muslim 
community) - the party of God (Hizb Allah).”4 The document expounds upon who 
constitutes the membership of Hezbollah by claiming, “We are an umma linked to the 
Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam … 
This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines 
and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an 
integral part.” In this statement, the importance of the umma as a singular unit to 
Hezbollah is exhibited, as is the necessity for the umma to act together. Hezbollah also 
incorporates an explicitly Shia doctrine into the idea of the umma by stating that their 
actions are based upon “legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political 
conception defined by the leading jurist,” identified in the document as Iran’s Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Beyond this Shia understanding of the umma and its leadership, the Open 
Letter also declares Hezbollah’s identity as a resistance movement, committed when 
necessary to the use of force, as “our military apparatus is not separate from our overall 
social fabric. ” 
After identifying itself as a Shia resistance movement dedicated to the universal 
causes of the umma, Hezbollah expounds upon its fight, the reason for its existence. In so 
                                                           
4 All quotations from Hezbollah’s Open Letter taken from document accessed from Stand With Us 
(http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf), credited to The Jerusalem Quarterly, 
number Forty-Eight, Fall 1988. This was the only source that provided the full document, though others 
corroborated the substance of the Open Letter.  
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doing, America, France, Israel, and the Phalangist are implicated as ones who “invaded 
our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our 
sanctuaries and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres 
against our umma.” This is in reference to actions by the Phalangists, the political party 
of Lebanese Maronites whose militia massacred thousands of Palestinians and Shias in 
the refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila due to the assassination of President Bashir 
Gemayel in 1982 (Jaber p77). The massacre, and the subsequent international silence 
regarding the massacre is noted as the reason for Hezbollah’s creation, as the Shia of 
Lebanon “could not bear any more treachery. It decided to oppose infidelity - be it 
French, American or Israeli - by striking at their headquarters and launching a veritable 
war of resistance against the Occupation forces.”  
With the purpose for Hezbollah’s existence explained, the Open Letter moves on 
to discuss the objectives of the movement, with three central goals. The first is “to expel 
the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon,” indicating that the 
movement is focused on the nationalistic issues of Lebanon. The second stated objective 
is “to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes 
they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians,” which again is focused within 
Lebanon. The third of the principle goals of Hezbollah is “to permit all the sons of our 
people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government 
they desire,” another explicitly Lebanese issue. The Open Letter is clear in stating that 
only Islam is capable of preventing further imperialistic inroads into Lebanon, though it 
also claims no desire to force an Islamic system upon Lebanon and that the confessional 
system of government is the cause of Lebanon’s problems, and must be replaced rather 
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than reformed.  
After identifying the objectives of Hezbollah, the Open Letter addresses both the 
Christians of Lebanon and the world. To the Christians, the letter urges toleration with 
Muslims, and further moves to proselytizing in saying, “Open yourselves up to Islam 
where you'll find salvation and happiness upon earth and in the hereafter. We extend this 
invitation also to all the oppressed among the non-Muslims.” To those outside of 
Lebanon, the Open Letter declares the Hezbollah rejects “both Capitalism and 
Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society,” and that 
Hezbollah as an organization seeks to bring justice to those who have not experienced 
justice.  
Hezbollah Since the Open Letter 
In the nearly 25 years since the publication of its Open Letter, Hezbollah has 
undergone drastic changes, most notably in its status, both within Lebanon and 
internationally. This section of the study will provide a brief overview of the 
development of Hezbollah since the Open Letter. Early in its development, including the 
period leading up to the Open Letter, Hezbollah “was surprising in its innovativeness and 
the level of determination and sacrifice that characterized its attacks,” to the point that by 
early 1984, Israel began to withdraw troops from parts of Lebanon (Azani p66). By 1987, 
five years after its conception, “Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon was a fait 
accompli. Nevertheless, it was defined as a presence with the aim of resisting Israel’s stay 
in the south,” and as such, were tolerated by Amal as a non-threat (Azani p64).  
The neutrality between the groups came to an end in 1988, following the 
kidnapping of a UN worker by a group linked to Hezbollah, which eventually led to the 
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War for Supremacy of South Lebanon in which “Amal, with military support from Syria, 
instigated the war on the basis that it was foiling Hezbollah’s attempts to take over its 
territory in South Lebanon and transform the area into an Islamic state” (Jaber p32-34). 
At the end of the war between the two Shia factions, “Hezbollah defeated the Amal 
movement in Beirut and won recognition as an organization with military and political 
power that must be taken into account. However, its failures in the south distanced it 
from the circle of anti-Israel activity” (Azani p76). The conflict between the two 
movements was settled by a series of Damascus Agreements, in which Hezbollah 
“assured both Syria and Amal’s leadership that, contrary to their belief, it had no interest 
in forming Islamic cantons in the South and was not interested in taking over as the 
Shiites political leader” (Jaber p35-36). While the war with Amal cemented Hezbollah’s 
status as a political and military force in Lebanon, it also signaled a shift towards a 
pragmatic approach to domestic politics, marked first of all by the peace settlements, 
which demonstrated Hezbollah’s desire that “first, it wanted to make the movement the 
standard bearer of the resistance against Israel by increasing its attacks on Israel, and 
second, it wanted to end the war with Amal and to restore its standing in the Shiite 
community” (Azani p85).  
As part of the restoration of its standing in the Shia community, “Hezbollah’s 
leaders engaged in a heated debate over whether to participate more fully within 
Lebanon’s political system,” with those in favor of participation winning, a decision 
standing in direct opposition to the Open Letter” (Noe p6-7). This coincided with 
Hezbollah’s election of new leadership, with Abbas al-Musawi replacing Subhi Al Tufeili 
as the secretary general, which was seen “as part of a new trend that would include 
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joining the Lebanese political system as an opposition party with a Lebanese character” 
(Azani p87-88). Al-Musawi was killed early in 1992, and was replaced by Hassan 
Nasrallah (who remains the secretary general of Hezbollah), who continued Hezbollah’s 
integration into Lebanon’s political system, as well as overseeing the “escalating rate of 
attacks in the early 1990’s, from 19 in 1990 to 187 in 1994” (Noe p7-8). Hezbollah 
participated in its first elections in 1992, and in it “captured eight of the twenty-seven 
seats allocated to the Shi‘ites in the Lebanese parliament,” as well as winning four other 
allied seats (Hamzeh p112-113). In 1996’s next round of elections, Hezbollah saw its 
representation drop from eight to six seats, a decrease that some attributed to the belief  
“that the fighting against Israel’s security zone came at the expense of the treatment of 
social problems” (Azani p105). Hezbollah rebounded in the 2000 elections winning nine 
seats as renewed emphasis on “the party’s committed constituency and its social welfare 
services that have contributed to Hizbullah’s success” (Hamzeh p115). By 2008, 
Hezbollah’s status had reached the point that “an agreement among the country's political 
factions gave Hezbollah and its opposition allies the right to veto any cabinet decision” 
(http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/hezbollah/index.htm
l?8qa&scp=1-spot&sq=&st=nyt). The latest round of elections in 2009 saw Hezbollah’s 
alliance win 57 total seat, a number fewer than expected, as “the Lebanese Parliament 
will be divided almost exactly as it was, denying the new majority a mandate to govern 
alone” (Slackman). Despite these results, it is clear that Hezbollah has grown to become  
a political force in Lebanon. 
In addition to its political growth, the period since the Open Letter has seen 
Hezbollah endure several conflicts with Israel. Among these are Israel’s 1993 Operation 
  47 
Accountability and 1996’s Operation Grapes of Wrath, as well as the 2006 Summer War 
(http://www.cfr.org/publication/15268/) the first two being incursions by Israel into 
southern Lebanon. Following the truce after Operation Accountability, “Hezbollah 
claimed that Israel breached the truce and attacked civilian targets 231 times between 
1993 and 1996. In return the Party of God says it retaliated with Katyushas (rockets) 
against settlements in northern Israel on thirteen occasions” (Jaber p173). In both of the 
operations, the goal was to “alienate the Lebanese civilian population from the Resistance 
in the hope of ending their support for Hezbollah,” but in both cases the strategy failed 
(Jaber p178). The 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel went further than the previous 
operations in demonstrating the growth and influence of Hezbollah. Following a July 12 
Hezbollah attack in which it kidnapped Israeli soldiers, Israel invaded Lebanon, and “of 
all Israel’s wars in 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most prepared” (Parsi 
p274). While both sides endured losses in the thirty-three days of fighting, “the war 
turned Hezbollah and its sponsor, Iran, into regional power brokers” (Nar p256). The 
result of this war was that “rather than strengthening and reinforcing the image of Israel’s 
invincible deterrence,” Israel was weakened and Hezbollah’s “strategic capability wasn’t 
significantly damaged, and its political strength within the complicated Lebanese 
sectarian mix may have been enhanced” (Parsi p276-277). This serves to demonstrate the 
growth and power of Hezbollah, as it has moved from a local Lebanese Shia resistance 
movement to a force capable of defeating Israel in war. 
Hezbollah and Islam 
Hezbollah, since its inception, has been a distinctly Shia movement. In its 
founding document, the Open Letter, it clearly states that it is part of the umma, and that 
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the culture of the movement “is based on the Holy Koran, the Sunna and the legal rulings 
of the faqih who is our source of imitation.” In this, the view of the umma as explained 
by Ayatollah Khomeini serves as the basis for the conception of the umma. Khomeini 
explained that “the imperialists and tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the 
Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic umma from 
each other and artificially created separate nations” (Khomeini p48-49). Further, 
Khomeini states that in response to this separation of the umma and “in order to liberate 
the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by imperialists and their puppet 
governments, it is imperative that we establish a government” (Khomeini p49). The 
government to be established is one led by the faqih, or Islamic jurist, and to Khomeini, 
“the governance of the faqih is a rational and extrinsic matter; it exists only as a type of 
appointment” (Khomeini p63). Thus, in the view of Khomeini, the understanding of the 
umma is as a single unit of all Muslims, and should be under the leadership of the just 
Islamic scholar. This reflects the tradition Shia understanding of the umma, as a singular 
unit under the guidance of the Imam, and waiting for the return of the Twelfth Imam.  
The importance of the Shia view of the umma and those of Ayatollah Khomeini to 
Hezbollah may be seen through the statements of Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general 
of Hezbollah. In a speech on the thirteenth anniversary of Khomeini’s death he declared 
the movement’s reliance upon the Shia conception of the umma, and that of Ayatollah 
Khomeini by stating “We pledge ourselves to our Imam on his day of remembrance, that 
he will remain ever present in our minds, our hearts, and the blood in our veins, until all 
our great and lofty objectives are achieved” (Noe p277). Nasrallah reiterated these 
sentiments in a speech for Al-Quds Day in 2005, stating that “the genius of Imam 
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Khomeini, who was so knowledgeable of his time, led him make this deeply intellectual, 
ideological, political, emotional, and popular connection between the most precious 
Islamic religious occasion and the most sacred and important of causes” (Noe p353), the 
cause being the unity of the umma in resisting Israel’s expansion into Jerusalem and 
Palestinian territory. In these, and numerous other statement, the leadership of Hezbollah 
has expressed a desire for the unity of the umma under religious leadership, for the cause 
of resistance.  
Conclusions 
In this study, the Shia conception of the umma has been presented, as has the 
history, development, and current position of Hezbollah. Through this study, it has 
become clear that the umma is an important factor for Hezbollah both ideologically and 
operationally. Throughout its development, Hezbollah has looked to both Islamic 
doctrine and the inspiration of Ayatollah Khomeini for direction. In this, the unity of the 
umma is seen as a goal for aspiration, and the rule of the umma by the leadership of the 
just Islamic jurist is a necessary component. While Hezbollah has moved towards 
pragmatism in its political stance, the importance of Islam and the umma has remained. 
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion 
This study began with the goal of determining what role, if any, religious doctrine 
play in forming the policy and directing the action of resistance movements in the Islamic 
world. In order to do this, the conception of the doctrine of the umma was investigated in 
both Sunni and Shia Islam. That investigation was combined with an examination of a 
Sunni and Shia resistance movement, Hamas and Hezbollah, and the role which Islamic 
doctrine, especially that of the umma, plays in each. In this conclusion, the conception of 
the umma in both Sunni and Shia Islam will be compared, as well as the role that such a 
conception plays in Hamas and Hezbollah. Finally, those findings will be contrasted with 
the anticipated outcome stated with the introduction of the study question. 
The Umma in Sunni versus Shia Islam 
In looking at the umma in both Sunni and Shia Islam, there have been many 
similarities, bit few differences. In both branches of Islam, the umma is the universal 
community of Muslim believers. Also, both branches see the umma as split due to the 
fracture of the Islamic world following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World 
War I. Sunni and Shia Islam both believe that the umma consists of all Muslims, despite 
doctrinal differences that may exist, while holding to the belief that doctrinal differences 
are simply areas in which other Muslims are misguided. Also, in both of these branches 
of Islam, the umma is a single political entity that supersedes any other form of allegiance 
or obligation. 
The central difference in the belief of Sunnis and Shias on the doctrine of the 
umma is in the area of leadership. This was the cause for the Sunni-Shia split, and 
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persists as the main cause for disagreement between the branches. Sunnis believe that 
leadership of the umma should be determined by consensus, and as a result, the leader is 
not required to be an expert in Islam, simply one who strives to follow the principles of 
Islam. The Shias disagree with the belief that the umma should be led by an Imam, and in 
waiting for the advent of the Twelfth Imam, that jurists should be in leadership. Due to 
this difference in the qualification for leadership, there is also a difference in the response 
to leadership. In Sunni Islam, the leader of the umma is a fallible individual, and 
therefore following the leadership is voluntary. For Shias, the Imam is the representative 
of Allah, and as such is a source for emulation, which necessitates greater attentiveness to 
the position of the umma. The importance of the leadership of the umma, and the choice 
in following the dictates of that leadership compose the main differences in the 
conception of the umma between Sunni and Shia Islam. 
The Umma in Hamas versus Hzbollah 
This study moved from examining the umma in Sunni and Shia Islam to looking 
at the umma in resistance movements. Hamas was used as an example of a Sunni 
resistance movement, while Hezbollah was examined as a Shia movement. In the 
investigation of both of these movements, it was demonstrated that both were founded 
with stringent adherence to Islamic doctrines, and that both moved towards a more 
pragmatic viewpoint as they moved into the mainstream of politics among their 
constituencies. In both cases though, the appeal to the umma remained, though in most 
instances, it was an appeal rather than a point of action. 
For Hamas, and the Sunni branch of Islam it represents, the umma plays a central 
role in its founding documents, as well as those that followed. In each of those cases, the 
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umma is referenced as a cause for their resistance to Israel as the land of Palestine is part 
of an Islamic trust that must be defended. Beyond that, through its documents, Hamas 
appeals to Muslims worldwide for support in their struggle, financially, physically, and in 
the media. In all of these appeals, Hamas reflects the Sunni view of the umma, in that 
Palestine is part a single unit that should be supported by all Muslims, but at the same 
time, it is upon the individual to decide to support Hamas in its resistance. 
Hezbollah also appeals to the umma through its founding documents and has 
continued to reference the umma through the statements of its leaders. However, while 
Hamas appeals to the umma to provide support for resistance, Hezbollah states that the 
unity of the umma is the reason for its existence, and that it will act for the cause of the 
umma. Beyond this, Hezbollah uses the umma as justification for its actions, and 
demands that Muslims participate in unifying the umma and acting for its defense. 
Hezbollah also points to the inspiration of Ayatollah Khomeini for the unity of the umma 
under jurists during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. In this difference between 
requests for voluntary action and the united umma acting under the leadership of jurists, 
the difference between Hamas and Hezbollah is seen. This serves to show that there is a 
difference in the conception of the umma, and how it affects the formation of policy and 
actions for these resistance movements. 
Study Question Revisited 
In the introduction, the question of this study was presented. At that point, it was 
stated that the adoption of particular aspects of religious doctrines would play a role in 
resistance movements and that how religious doctrines are perceived would serve to 
create identity within resistance movements, and further that the identity formed propels 
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the movement to action. More specifically to this study, this assumption was that there is 
a difference in the way Hezbollah and Hamas view the concept of umma, and that the 
difference would be in those included in the umma. The study has found that there is a 
difference in how Sunnis and Shias conceive the umma, and that difference is manifested 
in their actions and policies. This part supports the stated beliefs introducing this study. 
However, the difference in the two is not the scope of the umma, it is in the area of 
leadership. The issue of scope would have affected those grouped into the umma, and 
therefore would confine the territory for resistance to those areas in which members of 
the umma are found. However, since the issue is that of leadership, it is not the territory 
of resistance that is restrained, but the requirement to resist.  
Beyond the aspect of the umma, this study was centered on the question of 
identity as it relates to resistance. In both Hamas and Hezbollah, the Islamic nature of the 
movements propels the action of the members of the movement. The Sunni and Shia 
characteristics of each movement frame the necessity for resistance, and solidify the 
following of each of the movements. While the doctrine of the umma may not serve as 
the central premise for either Hamas or Hezbollah, it does serve to distinguish Sunni and 
Shia Islam, and it is Islam that fuels each of these movements. Therefore, the adoption of 
particular aspects of religious doctrines does play a role in resistance movements how 
religious doctrines are perceived serves to create identity that directs the policies and 
actions of resistance movements. 
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Appendix A 
Jihad and Resistance 
 The concept of the umma serves in the formation of identity for Islamic resistance 
movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and as such propels organizational action.  At 
the same time, no discussion of Islamic resistance is complete without addressing the 
issue of jihad. The main body of this study has attempted to refrain from such coverage, 
relegating the issue to an appendix, which seeks to explain the concept of jihad, correlate 
it to Islamic resistance, as well as providing an explanation of why the concept of jihad is 
designated for discussion in an appendix. 
 In the Quran, “the word jihad is mentioned about forty-one times” (Marranci 
p17). Beyond the Quran, the concept of jihad is developed in hadith and maghazi 
(literature), which record the experience and struggles of the early umma to build and 
sustain the Islamic faith in tumultuous times. The term itself derives “from the root j.h.d., 
the meaning of which is to strive, exert oneself, or take extraordinary pains. Jihad is a 
verbal noun of the third Arabic form of the root jahada, which is defined classically as 
‘exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavors, or ability in contending with an object 
of disapprobation’ ” (Firestone p16). In this basic definition of jihad as “striving” the 
difficulty in understanding may be seen, because the directive of striving is not clearly 
identified. Due to this lack of clarity, the concept of jihad is often divided between 
greater and lesser jihad, where “spiritual jihad, or jihad bil-nafs, is seen by most Muslims 
as the ‘greater jihad.’ On the other hand, there is also the concept of jihad bil-sayf, 
literally ‘jihad by the sword,’ or violent jihad, traditionally viewed as the ‘lesser jihad’ ” 
(Springer p18).  While there is this distinction between the greater and lesser jihad, “the  
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Quranic word jihad became associated with a full, complex doctrine and set of practices 
relating to the conduct of war” (Bonner p22). This may be seen in the hadith tradition, in 
which the prophet Muhammad is at one point quoted, “I would like to fight in the way of 
Allah and be killed, then be brought to life again so I could be killed, and then be brought 
to life again so I could be killed” (Peters p21), helping to create a culture of martyrdom, 
as jihad is made a physical conflict. 
 The evolution of the concept of jihad into a doctrine for the conduct of war may 
be seen as a four-step process. Reuven Firestone identifies these four stages, both in the 
traditional understanding, as well as reorganizing them based on groupings of Quranic 
verses. The traditional stages, which correspond to the historic needs of the umma are as 
follows: nonconfrontation; defensive fighting; initiating attack allowed but within the 
ancient strictures; and unconditional command to fight all unbelievers (Firestone p51-65). 
Firestone regroups the Quranic verses thematically with the following divisions: “(1) 
Verses expressing nonmilitant means of propagating or defending the faith; (2) Verses 
expressing restrictions on fighting; (3) Verses expressing conflict between God’s 
command and the reaction of Muhammad’s followers; (4) Verses strongly advocating 
war for God’s religion” (Firestone p69). In both ways of categorizing verses regarding 
jihad, the concept is seen both as an internal and external struggle. Also, the verses 
demonstrate that there are different occasions for the use of each type of struggle, which 
creates a necessity of interpretation and discernment for practice of the verses. 
 One style of interpretation used for understanding the Quran is known as 
abrogation or naskh. The term naskh “literally means ‘obliteration’ or ‘annulment’. It is  
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the suspension or replacement of one ruling by another, provided that the latter is of 
subsequent origin, and that the two rulings are enacted separately from one another” 
(Bonney p24). Abrogation developed as it was seen that “the Quran appears to contain a 
great deal of seemingly contradictory material” as a way to “determine which of the 
inconsistent statements on a topic was the latest to have been revealed” (Firestone p49). 
This process attempts to cope with the apparent contradictions and debated passages in 
the Quran, but there is not a consensus regarding the understanding of jihad. The Quran 
“was transmitted to the world through the person of Muhammad, who died in 632 CE,” 
(Bonner p23) however Muhammad transmitted the Quran orally, and the following 
process of creating a written collection of the Quran was completed during the reign of 
the caliph ‘Uthman (644-656 CE). This gap has allowed for debate over the chronology 
of when specific verses were revealed to Muhammad, and therefore, the order for 
abrogation, which is especially true in the understanding of jihad, as well as how the act 
of jihad becomes obligatory for the umma.  
In addition to the practice of abrogation being used in an attempt to clarify some 
of the confusion associated with the concept of jihad, examination of the tradition of the 
hadith is also incorporated in to building an understanding of jihad. The word hadith 
“means ‘a piece of information,’ ‘narrative,’ or ‘account’ ” (Firestone p93), and as such, 
the hadith is composed of “reports of sayings and deeds, with normative force, attributed 
to the Prophet and those around him” (Bonner p21). These rose to importance in Islam as 
it was realized that “the fixed text of the Quran could not answer all the questions that 
naturally arose within the new community with regard to proper religious ritual, personal  
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behavior, and law” (Firestone p93). To address these questions, “these traditions cover a 
broad range of subjects, in some instances supplementing accounts in the Quran, in others 
treating events and issues not addressed therein” (Cook p13-14). 
In the Sunni tradition, the hadith remained as an oral tradition “until the ninth 
century, when tens of thousands of individual traditions were collected and reduced to 
writing in dozens of collections … six of these collections of prophetic traditions from 
the ninth century eventually took precedence over all others” (Firestone p95). In the Shia 
tradition, collection of the hadith extended beyond the ninth century to include the 
sayings of the Imams in addition to those of the prophet Muhammad. In his book, 
Understanding Jihad, David Cook traces the development of the hadith from the oral to 
written tradition, as well as providing an overview of those who collected the sayings, 
and identifying that “much of the extensive tradition literature on the subject of jihad 
concerns broad themes: defining fighters and fighting, distinguishing classes of 
prohibitions in fighting, determining the equitable division of spoils and the fate of 
prisoners” (Cook p15).  In discussing jihad, the central theme found in the hadith is “the 
propagation of the faith through combat,” while other themes include the conduct of 
warfare, leadership, collection of taxes from non-Muslims (jizya), asceticism, intention of 
jihad, martyrdom, and the internalized jihad (Bonner p49-51).  
The use of the hadith is for questions that are not clearly addressed in the Quran, 
and therefore carries nearly as much weight as the Quran. The hadith, however, does not 
solve all issues of understanding with the concept of jihad. This is due to the necessity for 
Quranic understanding to create a universally unified position regarding apparent  
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contradictions, while the hadith does not necessitate a consensus on the understanding of 
jihad. Thus, some of the hadith may come into disagreement, therefore “the listener or 
reader – especially if he holds a position of responsibility, such as judgeship – must 
choose between the conflicting traditions and must state the reasons and methods that 
have brought him to his choice” (Bonner p47). It is due to these complexities regarding 
jihad in the interpretation of the Quran, hadith, et cetera which exceed the parameters of 
this study, and deflect attention from the focus on the role of resistance by the umma, that 
the topic of jihad has been excluded from the larger study. 
Much like the idea of umma, the conception of jihad differs within the Sunni and 
Shi’i communities. In the Sunni view of jihad, “the crux of the doctrine is the existence of 
one single Islamic state, ruling the entire umma. It is the duty of the umma to expand the 
territory of this state in order to bring as many people under its rule as possible. The 
ultimate aim is to bring the whole earth under the sway of Islam and to extirpate 
unbelief” (Peters p3). Under the Sunni view, “the Qur'an requires Muslims to strive to 
establish just public order overall. It is at this point that jihad becomes an offensive 
endeavor to bring about the world order that the Qur'an seeks” (Sachedina p106). Thus, 
the Sunni view of jihad is as a required exercise for the umma, meant to expand the 
influence of Islam throughout the globe. 
The Shi’i view of jihad and the umma is similar to the Sunni view, but there are a 
few key differences. As previously noted, in the Sunni view jihad “the Islamic state [was] 
conceived as the sphere where the Islamic norms prescribed in the Shari'a were 
paramount. This conception of jihad was scrutinized by the Shi'i jurists in the light of  
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their Imams' statements that did not regard the wars of expansion as being motivated by 
the Quranic injunction” (Sachedina p108).  Thus, the Shia do not agree with the idea of 
using jihad for expansion of Islamic territory for either political or religious gains. The 
other key difference between the two is that “the Twelver Shiites hold that jihad can only 
be waged under the leadership of the rightful Imam” (Peters p4). To clarify the idea of 
leadership for jihad, “Imamite jurisprudence consistently underscores the point that the 
call to jihad can be issued only by an individual who is most learned in the purpose and 
the aim of Islamic revelation … such an individual is the Imam or his deputy who 
possesses ‘sound belief’ (iman sahih) and ‘sound knowledge’ ('ilm sahih)” (Sachedina p 
109). This traditional view holds that the jurists have guardianship over three areas of 
community life: first, “over the persons and property of those who might otherwise be 
victimized,” second “over property and activities upon which the religious life of the 
community depends,” and third “over the welfare of the Muslim community, 
encompassing the responsibility of serving as a social force” (Rose p169). Ayatollah 
Khomeini expanded the Shii jurists’ authority as representatives of the Imam through his 
elaboration of the concept of velayat-e faqih in calling for jihad, which provided the just 
jurist with the authority to rule on behalf of and as representative for the Imam during his 
occultation.  
Aside from these views on the expansionist aims of jihad and the necessity of the 
Imam, or his deputy, for declaration of jihad, the Sunni and Shi’i view of jihad is quite 
similar. This similarity has been paired with a popular distortion of jihad as “holy war”, 
and in many cases an unrestrained war against all so-called “infidels” that has become the  
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common understanding of jihad in the West. This understanding ignores the far more 
important Muslim discourse of the “greater jihad,” which describes, “personal struggles 
within oneself and struggles like that against poverty” (Deeb p204), struggles detailed by 
Laura Deeb’s studies of personal piety and gender roles among Lebanese Shia in her 
book An Enchanted Modern. Despite this emphasis on personal struggle, “the word jihad 
has been much maligned, used wither to conjure fear or to inspire violence” (Deeb p204). 
With this, jihad has become a weighted term that may not simply be mentioned, 
but instead become a term that requires explanation and history to strip the values and 
prejudices that may be held by the reader. At the same time, any discussion of resistance 
in Islam requires a discussion of jihad, because it is the doctrine of struggle and striving 
in the name of Allah. There can be no resistance without struggling, and jihad is the 
concept that guides such action in Islam.
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